Hostile remixes on YouTube: A new constraint on pro-FARC counterpublics in Colombia by Fattal, Alexander L
UC San Diego
UC San Diego Previously Published Works
Title
Hostile remixes on YouTube: A new constraint on pro-FARC counterpublics in Colombia
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/61p1m9s2
Journal
American Ethnologist, 41(2)
ISSN
0094-0496
Author
FATTAL, ALEX
Publication Date
2014-05-01
DOI
10.1111/amet.12078
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
ALEX FATTAL
Harvard University
Hostile remixes on YouTube:
A new constraint on pro-FARC counterpublics in Colombia
A B S T R A C T
Online video streaming marks a participatory turn in
Colombia’s propaganda war. To understand this shift,
I analyze a video the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) produced of its kidnapping of 12
provincial parliamentarians in 2002, tracing
fragments of that video as they “recombine” online
in two other videos that antagonistically resignify
the original. I conduct the same exercise with
footage of the Colombian military’s rescue of I´ngrid
Betancourt and 14 other hostages in 2008 and
contrast its celebratory recombinations with those
of the FARC video. Building on Michael Warner’s
theory of publics and counterpublics and Mikhail
Bakhtin’s concept of “re-accentuation,” I argue that
“recombinatory circulation” reproduces the biases of
Colombia’s mass media, constraining pro-FARC
counterpublics. I contextualize the circulation
analysis with ethnography focused on former
hostages, demobilized rebels, and military
intelligence officials. Beyond Colombia, I argue for
converting interactive circulation into an empirical
and analytical prism to illuminate the politics of
online publics. [media politics, Colombia violence,
video streaming, online circulation, media events,
FARC kidnapping, Michael Warner, Mikhail Bakhtin]
Scene One: On April 11, 2002, members of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) enter a government building in down-
town Cali disguised as military officers and warn of a bomb attack.
They kidnap 12 provincial parliamentarians. Five years later, 11 of
the hostages are killed in an accidental massacre. The only survivor,
Sigifredo Lo´pez, is released on February 5, 2009.
Scene Two: On July 2, 2008, Colombianmilitary officers impersonating
humanitarian aid workers, journalists, and FARC rebels execute “Op-
eration Check” (as in checkmate), rescuing I´ngrid Betancourt and 14
other hostages of the FARC who have been languishing in the jungle
for years.
T
he FARC and the Colombianmilitary both released videos of their
respective duplicitous operations in an effort to put their stamp
on the events. In this article, I analyze those two videos, trac-
ing their circulation and examining the events and structures in
which they are embedded. Central to the analysis is what I call
“recombinatory circulation,” a form of circulation marked by reconfigura-
tions of an earlier text. Akin to the remix as a formof audio bricolage (Maira
1999), recombination involves the reappearance of audiovisual fragments
in new, derivative videos that stream online (Shifman 2011). More broadly,
the term recombination highlights the centrality of interactivity in the cir-
culation of digital and digitized media as a means of advancing or con-
straining publics.
In this article, I make two interconnected interventions. First, I argue
that recombinatory circulation reproduces the FARC’s long-standing me-
dia marginalization, highlighting the limits of YouTube as an open and
level media space in Colombia.1 The online propaganda battle, then, mir-
rors the country’s asymmetrical military struggle, in which 445,000 gov-
ernment troops overwhelm the FARC’s 10,000 (Centro Nacional de Memo-
ria Histo´rica 2013:179).2 Online, the Colombian conflict plays out through
likes, favorites, shares, comments, and reedited videos (I focus on the lat-
ter), and here too the government outmatches the rebels. The patterns of
recombinatory circulation of the two videos I trace reinscribe online the
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anti-FARC biases of corporate television and radio in
Colombia. In short, online publics recombine the FARC’s
video into new videos that are thinly veiled calls for
vengeance, and they recombine the government’s video
into derivative, celebratory videos. This contrast illuminates
the limits of “digital democracy” in the Colombian context.
YouTube, rather than eroding the FARC’s long-standingme-
dia marginalization, re-creates severe media constraints on
the FARC.
At the heart of that argument lies the partial displace-
ment of censorship by drowning out pro-FARC voices and
amplifying calls for violence against the rebels.3 My sec-
ond intervention urges greater anthropological scrutiny of
how such silencing works through the interactive circula-
tion of online media. Rehashing, remixing, and refashion-
ing are commonly cited practices in the distribution of on-
line content (Burgess and Green 2009; Jenkins 2006; Kara-
ganis 2007; Uricchio 2009; van Dijck 2009). But how are we
to understand the political significance of such interactive
circulation within a given context? The anthropology of on-
line media, a still-nascent subfield, has yet to address this
question, even as kindred issues, such as piracy, receive
rich ethnographic treatment (e.g., Thomas 2012; Larkin
2008). Like piracy, participatorymodes of circulation online
have an often-obscured political charge that an ethnogra-
phy combining online and offline sociopolitical worlds can
elucidate.
The mere fact that 100 hours of video are uploaded to
YouTube every minute (YouTube 2013b) is compelling rea-
son to focus anthropological attention on the politics of
the intertextual world of online video. Of that 100 hours
of footage, very few videos will “go viral” (Burgess 2008),
while many will become “memetic,” generative of deriva-
tives (Shifman 2011). When CNN integrates footage into its
newscasts that Syrian activists have risked their lives to up-
load (Khamis et al. 2012) or when pro-Palestine activists
and the Israeli state visually argue their cases on YouTube in
the wake of the Gaza flotilla tragedy (Stein 2012) by recom-
bining the same footage differently, to cite two glaring ex-
amples, recombinatory circulation is politically charged. In
examining the role of recombinatory circulation in Colom-
bia’s propaganda war, my larger goal is to provide a frame-
work for ethnographically advancing renewed anthropolog-
ical interest in “cultures of circulation” (Lee and LiPuma
2002) and the “circulatory matrix” (Gaonkar and Povinelli
2003) by foregrounding interactive circulation in the politi-
cal analysis of online publics.
I develop my central argument about recombinatory
circulation on YouTube as a new constraint on pro-FARC
publics in four parts. Following a brief discussion of publics
and methods, Part 1 provides a close reading of the FARC’s
video and its recombinations. Part 2 places themedia event
in the context of its antecedents and in the historical mo-
ment of the turn of the millennium. Part 3 scrutinizes
Operation Check, including the footage the military re-
leased immediately afterward and the recombinations of
that footage. Part 4 contrasts the twopatterns of recombina-
tory circulation and reflects on the implications of their di-
vergence for the prospect of a negotiated solution toColom-
bia’s armed conflict.
Setting the stage: Interactivity and a stymied
counterpublic
In his seminal book Publics and Counterpublics, Michael
Warner defines publics as infinite, expanding, interrelated
text-based communities that engage in struggles within
and among themselves through the process of circulation.
He writes, “Publics are essentially intertextual, frameworks
for understanding texts against an organized background
of the circulation of other texts, all interwoven” (Warner
2002:16). When a public is radically opposed to a domi-
nant ideology and defined by others through that opposi-
tion, Warner characterizes that public as a “counterpublic”
(2002:56; see also Hirschkind 2001). By vying for popular at-
tention, counterpublics function similarly to publics in all
but their hostile reception (Warner 2002:119). For Warner,
publics and counterpublics are produced and reproduced
“only in relation to texts and their circulation” (2002:66).
Interactivity has been a source of critique for Warner’s
theorization of publics. Guobin Yang and Craig Calhoun
(2007) argue, contra Warner, that interactivity can consti-
tute a public. In online streaming communities, it becomes
a facet of circulation itself, as videos mash up audiovi-
sual fragments, while comments, likes, dislikes, favorites,
and flags invite audience participation. I shift the discus-
sion of publics and counterpublics toward the linkages
between interactivity and circulation online while embrac-
ing the underlying dynamics of counterpublics as articu-
lated by Warner. As the media scholar Henry Jenkins (2006)
has observed, media production, circulation, and reception
have been radically compressed online, and interactivity
is both a cause and consequence. Certain forms of inter-
activity, such as video recombination, render the paths of
circulation less predictable and more contingent. Warner’s
conception of interactivity as subordinate to circulation
(2002:67–74), however, limits the applicability of his the-
ory to online publics. Yet when YouTube users recombine
existing videos and recirculate them, interactivity and cir-
culation are tightly interwoven. In line with Yang and Cal-
houn’s (2007) critique, I argue that watching, downloading,
and editing a video and then posting a recombined version
constitutes not only a public but also, often, a locus of its
politics.
A decade before Warner conceived of publics as ori-
ented around texts in circulation, a related discussion
emerged among sociolinguistic anthropologists on “entex-
tualization,” the ripping of texts from their social contexts
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and—in a process termed “reentextualization” (Silverstein
and Urban 1996:13) or “recontextualization” (Bauman and
Briggs 1990:74–75)—their placement in new circuits of
performance and circulation (Parmentier 1994; Silverstein
1988). While my examination of recombinatory circulation
carries traces of reentextualization or recontextualization, it
diverges from that discussion on the question of interactiv-
ity. As I do inmy engagementwithWarner, I extend thework
of sociolinguistic anthropologists to address the heightened
interactivity of online circulation.4
I theorize the politics of interactivity through a
recombinatory-circulation analysis that is at once an
iteration of textual analysis for the digital age and an
extension of George Marcus’s injunction for ethnogra-
phers to engage in “tracking strategies” (1995:95). How-
ever, the tracking is not of a stable text but, rather, one
continually undergoing what Mikhail Bakhtin has called
“re-accentuation” (2004:419–422), a stylized copying that
transforms the original through dialogic engagement with
related texts in circulation at the time and with the voices
they contain. In adapting re-accentuation to online video
circulation, I use the term recombination to capture how
this interactivity generates new video texts.5
In Colombia, the proliferation of derivative videos, al-
gorithmically juxtaposed, becomes a dense but unevenfield
of political ideology in which right-wing publics viscerally
opposed to the FARC conduct the vast majority of the re-
combination. Any effort to produce and perform a pro-
FARC counterpublic encounters participatory opposition
in YouTube forums. In the analysis that follows, the diffi-
culty of finding common discursive ground between the
Colombian government and the FARC comes into sharp re-
lief. If the FARC, in part because of its media marginaliza-
tion, continues to be systematically denied political space,
the prospects for its transition to unarmed politics—a
scenario on the horizon with the current negotiations—will
remain dim. In the list of anticipated challenges to the cur-
rent peace process—land redistribution, income inequal-
ity, drug trafficking, legal inefficiency, and victims’ rights—
media access is absent. However, as I highlight here, lop-
sided media access is a seldom-discussed structural chal-
lenge to building popular support for a future peace accord,
which is likely to be signed by late 2014.6 A peace agreement
will require a referendumor other participatorymechanism
to endow itwith popular legitimacy. In that crucialmoment,
the visceral opposition from right-wing publics, if not tem-
pered, could act as another tripwire on the path to a polit-
ical solution to Colombia’s war. Beyond Colombia, I draw
attention to the recombinatory logic of online video stream-
ing and its increasing significance for propaganda struggles
around the globe. I hope to encourage more ethnographic
work that illuminates the oft-obscured political charge of
participatory circulation by combining online and offline
methods.
Setting the stage: Methods
To track the propaganda battle between the FARC and
the Colombian government, I move beyond the intertex-
tual web of online video and draw on two years of ethno-
graphic research on the Colombianmilitary’s guerrilla mar-
keting campaigns to demobilize FARC rebels as well as on
five months of research on how political exiles in Sweden
use the Internet to participate in Colombia’s information
war (Fattal 2014). In my conversations after soccer matches
with demobilized rebels outside their transitional home, in
discussions with military intelligence officers in cars with
tinted windows, in interviews with former hostages in up-
scale Bogota´ cafes, and in the semiclandestine world of rad-
ical left-wingColombian radio in Stockholm, the events that
define this article and the reflections on the media politics
surrounding them were recurrent topics of conversation.
Sometimes, discussions shifted unexpectedly to the me-
dia events in question, as happened, for instance in a life-
history interviewwithMarta,7 a rebel whowas captured, of-
fered the chance to demobilize, and plied for intelligence
used to plan Operation Check. This ethnography and the
three years I spent researching the recombinatory circula-
tion of the two video texts online serve as productive foils.
My methodology balances online and offline worlds to
give due weight to the emergent role of online forums while
situating the YouTube contestation in a wider media en-
vironment and political arena. Because political terrain is
fragmented but contiguous online and off, I argue against
segregating the two. The research I conducted in video-
streaming forumsmademe feel as though I wasmakingmy
way through an audiovisual labyrinth of unknown propor-
tions: YouTube’s archive (Prelinger 2009). Conducting inter-
views with former hostages, demobilized rebels, and mil-
itary intelligence officers grounded that experience in the
wider psychological war these propagandistic video texts
engage. I strive to weave the two together in creative and
considered ways to represent the fluidity between online
and offline worlds in Colombia’s war.
Part 1: The FARC’s video and its antagonistic
recombinations
The FARC’s video
I saw the 14-minute video for the first time in Bogota´, in
2006. A journalist slotted a CD given to her by FARC ur-
ban militias into his laptop. I noted a hint of amusement
in his gaze, a look that placed him in the know and me al-
most there. In that first viewing, my mouth agape, I could
only partially process what I was seeing. The cliche´ par-
roted to foreigners came to mind: “In Colombia, anything
can happen” [En Colombia, pasa de todo]. The fact that I
was exposed to the propaganda video on a CD circulating in
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an underground network speaks to its necessarily restricted
modes of circulation.8
In the opening shots, people scramble through the por-
tico of a colonial building while an off-screen voice, am-
plified by a megaphone, directs the chaos. The FARC logo
hangs in the upper-left corner of the screen as the slow gait
and unsteady hand of the videographer guide the viewer
onto a bus. “FARC-EP Productions” bisects the screen as the
voice behind the megaphone announces, “For the parlia-
mentarians, there’s a special vehicle.”9 The title card, For
an Exchange (Por el canje)—of hostages—sits over a still
frame of suited parliamentarians seated on the bus, star-
ing blankly at the camera. The video then flashes back to
preparations for their kidnapping. The scenes toggle be-
tween boot-camp drills and rebels in formation responding
to staccato orders. The videographer zooms in on a German
shepherd that will serve as a “bomb-sniffing dog” during
the operation, a shrewd symbol in the performance of au-
thenticity on which it will hinge. In another scene, the FARC
choreographs logistics, using black plastic sheeting to cre-
ate a blueprint of the parliament building. A group of insur-
gents makes a mistake, and laughter follows. The rehearsal,
in the rain, is crude.
The preparations draw to a close. Over a quiet
nightscape, the videographer’s female voice whispers to a
colleague that the cluster of lights in the distance is a base
from which the FARC fears a military response will come.
Cut to the morning, good-luck handshakes, and a shaky
recording of the bus’s descent along a switchback. The date–
time stamp counts, “April 11, 9:05:23 a.m.” Walkie-talkie
static interrupts birds’ chirping. Then the scene shifts to a
second camera looking through the windshield of the bus,
commercial radio blaring.Motorcycles lead the bus into the
outskirts of Cali, its wealthy suburbs, and finally the city
center.
The scene suddenly cuts back to the pandemonium in
the portico from the introduction. After a few moments of
unsteadily recorded images, we are back on the bus, this
time with the parliamentarians. Sigifredo Lo´pez, the only
hostage who would survive the event’s tragic fate, responds
to a question from the guerrilla videographer posing as a
local journalist, a poignant example of how the media it-
self has become a tactical weapon in the armed conflict.10
“The army says there’s a gas cylinder [a crude bomb used by
the FARC] and made us evacuate the building,” Lo´pez says.
When I interviewed him in a trendy Bogota´ cafe´ in 2012, he
recalled that the videographer was wearing a T-shirt with
the logo of TelePacı´fico, the regional state-sponsored tele-
vision station. He reflected, “In that moment of the video,
we didn’t yet knowwewere kidnapped. I interpret the video
as a joke the FARC made, not only at our expense but also
making fun of the state’s security apparatus because of the
form of the kidnapping itself, the spectacle of it. To come
into downtown Cali, the third largest city in Colombia, and
take us like sheep to slaughter.”11
On-screen, as the bus revs up a hill, the parliamen-
tarians clamor, “Where are we heading, boss?” The ques-
tion is received in silence. Then, a belated reply: “Ladies
and gentlemen, we are the FARC. We are taking you from
downtown Cali.”12 The motor roars as the bus speeds off
to the Farallones Mountains. As the insurgents, now wear-
ing FARC armbands, move their hostages from the bus to
a cattle truck, the captives recognize the gravity of their lot
and look at one another in disbelief. When the truck pulls
into a rebel-controlled area, a passenger in the cab gives a
thumbs-up. A salsa balladwith the refrain “Listen up, gener-
als” plays as the rebels embrace, and the video flashes back
to previous scenes. The prankish braggadocio then shifts to
an ideological key as the video ends with a series of leftist
critiques denouncing an exclusive political elite, state ter-
rorism, and gringo intervention. Finally, the credits:
 FARC-EP Productions, February 2004, Edited in the
Mountains of Colombia (Editado en las Montan˜as de
Colombia)
 All of the images in this video have been made
by camerapeople of the FARC-EP (camaro´grafos de
las FARC-EP) during the preparation and execution
phases of the operation that culminated in the de-
tention of the 12 parliamentarians of the Assembly
of Valle de Cauca.
FARC rebels acting as members of the military is the
most obvious formof doubling in the kidnapping video. An-
other is its style, which mimes and mixes genres. The logo,
titles, and credits suggest a television documentary, and
the tightly organized teleological narrative, preceded by a
trailer, mimics a Hollywood film. But the unsteady camera-
work, personal relationship between the videographers and
protagonists, and lack of any pretense of neutralitymark the
video as distinctive, at once more personal andmore politi-
cal than the formulismof established genres. The resonance
with documentary television and Hollywood film implic-
itly mocks Colombian mass media (Mart´ın-Barbero 2003).
Similar to the stiob genre of parody in late-Soviet socialism
(Yurchak 2005:249–250), the FARC video imitates the for-
mulism ofmassmedia to disrupt its ideological foundation.
Whereas the creators of stiob relied on a strategic “over-
identification” with state discourse to achieve a subtlety
that might protect them (Boyer and Yurchak 2010:181–183),
the FARC is openly at war with the Colombian state and so
does not hide its authorship.
In splashing “Editado en las Montan˜as de Colombia”
across the screen, as well as crediting the “camaro´grafos
de las FARC-EP,” the video conjures a parallel, occult uni-
verse of media production capable of documenting and
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promoting the spectacle of the FARC’s operations and
interpolating a sympathetic counterpublic. But the for-
malistic similarities to other genres are offset by the
political rhetoric at the end. That ambivalence encap-
sulates a strategy of parody, the crafting of a video
that is familiar but different; spiked with playfulness,
as in the coy salsa song at the end, but extraordi-
narily serious. In her book about “the Billionaires,” a
satirical troupe of political activists, Angelique Haugerud
reminds us that “parody is serious business” (2013:190–
191). Dominic Boyer and Alexei Yurchak underscore the
point, noting that it is capable of “making that which is
invisible and unthinkable, suddenly recognized and ap-
prehended” (2010:212). The parody of the FARC’s video
does precisely that, exposing the spectral presence of the
FARC—normally limited to clandestinemilitias—in Colom-
bian cities and humiliating the state in a government
building.
Recent scholarship has identified parody as a weapon
increasingly wielded in formal politics (Boyer 2013) and on-
line (Bernal 2013), especially on YouTube (Hess 2009; Shif-
man 2013; Tyron 2008). Parody on YouTube can take many
forms: The video, with its invitation to laugh at the parlia-
mentarians for having fallen into FARC’s trap, is a particu-
larly dark variety. Although the FARC’s precise intentions in
creating this video remain murky, the group directed it to
a range of audiences, as I show below, within and outside
its ranks.13 At a discursive level, the videomanages to blend
into and disrupt Colombia’s media environment by per-
forming the “heteroglossia” of mass-media genres, to bor-
row a term from Bakhtin’s analysis of the novel. For Bakhtin
(2004:262), the novel combines multiple voices, creating
a polysemic image of a language, prone to resignification
through devices like parody: “In order to be authentic and
productive, parody must be precisely a parodic stylization,
that is it must re-create the parodied language as an au-
thentic whole, giving it its due as a language possessing its
own internal logic” (2004:364). The FARC’s video parodies
the audiovisual grammars of documentary television, Hol-
lywood film, and home video and, in so doing, challenges
them—but only to the extent it circulates unadulterated.
Fragments recirculate online: Two recombinations
Ojo Digital, an obscure production house in Uruguay, made
a 25-minute television documentary titled Those Who Are
Going To Die Send You Regards (Los que van a morir te
saludan).14 The documentary reinscribes the FARC’s orig-
inal video in the familiar structure of documentary tele-
vision, generating sympathy for the families of the cap-
tives (particular attention is paid to their children) and of
a policeman who was killed. In one scene, another police-
man who has just discovered his colleague’s body runs out
of the parliament building in tears, raging against those
“sons of bitches.” The people who try to calm him then find
the other officer, whose limp body is loaded into a police
van and rushed to the hospital. The voice-over informs the
viewer that the policeman had offered his antiexplosive ex-
pertise to the “military personnel” responding to the bomb
threat in the building and that he did not survive. Rebels had
strangled him in the bathroom.
The title of the video recurs in two hostages’ on-screen
testimonies. The first comes at the beginning of the doc-
umentary, as Jairo Javier Hoyos, in a nasal voice, pro-
claims, “Los que van a morir te saludan.” The line, eerily
mouthed by a vulnerable figure, was scripted by the FARC.
It warns the state to tread carefully, not to attempt a res-
cue, and to release the rebels’ imprisoned comrades. The
segment illustrates a perverse genre—proof-of-life videos—
in which threats are interspersed with emotional mes-
sages from hostages to their families. Broadcast teams
angled to record the parliamentarians’ families watching
such videos, consummating the reinscription of the media
event in an established narrative about the human toll of
kidnapping.
The second recombination of the FARC’s video is not
so multilayered. “Zarcoman,” the screen name of a Colom-
bian military officer whose other uploads include com-
bat scenes and a video titled simply “FARC TERRORIS-
TAS,” takes excerpts from the original and uses a tex-
tual overlay to define the FARC as “ENEMIES OF THE
PEOPLE.”15 This crude resignification strips the original
video of its uncanny qualities and converts it into visual tes-
timony of the FARC’s inhumanity. With over 133,000 views
(as of July 2013), Zarcoman’s video has struck a chord.
The FARC’s video, meanwhile, is periodically removed from
YouTube, presumably for violating its community guide-
lines (YouTube 2013a), denying it such an impressive view
count.16
The comments on Zarcoman’s video provide the tex-
tual counterpart to the voices that come to the fore through
the recombinatory circulation of the FARC’s video. While
occasional comments sympathize with the parliamentari-
ans’ plight, the vitriolic sample below is representative of
most of the 399 comments (as of July 2013) on Zarcoman’s
video:
A: BITCH guerrillas TRIPLESONSOFBITCHESOF SHIT
LET THEM ROT AS THE GLORIOUS MILITARY WILL
FINISH THEM ONE BY ONE AND THEY’LL DIE LIKE
THE DOG reyes [a FARC leader killed in an attack in
Ecuador] WITH HIS LEGS UP SHITTING FROM FEAR
T: thosewho insult the guerrillas are themost ignorant
in the country as the media have them blinded, if you
all eat everything in the caption like this piece of shit
video you’re IDIOTS
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S: farc and its mother are going to see if they like if t he
same were done to their relatives
T: let the mothers of all of these fucking sb die . . .
A: Let the military offensive against the NARCOTER-
RORISTS of the FARC and their accomplices continue,
let it rain lead and bombs day and night, hard to their
head, amen.17
The pro-FARC counterpublic is outshouted in this forum, its
emergence in an occasional comment only enraging right-
wing publics, which employ not only gendered expletives
but also language codified by the military, such as “nar-
coterrorist” (Tate n.d.). As Warner writes, texts and their
publics operate within a logic of competition: “Texts clamor
at us. Images solicit our gaze. Look here! Listen! Hey! In
doing so, they by no means render us passive. Quite the
contrary” (2002:89). The commenters—or “haters” (Lange
2007)—who respond to the videos proclaim their position
within a constellation of publics. Polemical commentary
helps propagate Zarcoman’s video,making itmore locatable
andmoving it to the discursive center, a process enabled by
YouTube’s take-down policies.
In the Colombian context, Zarcoman’s resignification
serves as evidence in the country’s ongoing public argu-
ment over kidnapping. In the 1980s and early 1990s, when
hostage taking was limited to the internecine battles be-
tween drug dealers, armed groups, and the nation’s eco-
nomic and political elite, it functioned as just another dirty
tactic in a war that had been degenerating for decades
(Uribe 2004). Kidnappers justified their acts in terms of ter-
ritorial clashes and class resistance. But, by the late 1990s,
even the middle class found itself vulnerable to the “mirac-
ulous catch” (pesca milagrosa). On an intercity bus, even
people of modest means became bait for the FARC (Rubio
2003). Carla, a Colombian leftist and political exile in Swe-
den who is increasingly critical of the FARC, half-jokingly
speculated, “Themiraculous catchmust have been the idea
of someone who infiltrated [the FARC].” Kidnapping, she
concluded, has been devastating to the FARC’s legitimacy,
expanding the affliction of the upper classes to the wider
public.18 Zarcoman’s resignification, meanwhile, produces
and exploits the general public’s disdain for kidnapping by
linking it to other human rights abuses, such as recruiting
children, that index moral bankruptcy.
Through the Ojo Digital and Zarcoman recombina-
tions, new voices are brought into the media event—a kid-
napped parliamentarian, a hysterical policeman who has
just witnessed his friend’s death, a bellowing omniscient
narrator, relatives of the hostages, and a zealous soldier—
voices that echo in the commentary. The recombinatory cir-
culation intimates retaliation, not only for the cunning kid-
napping but also its perpetrators’ boastful video.
Part 2: The media event in context
The media event in history: Mobilizing after an accidental
massacre
Byproducing the video described above, the FARC sought to
interpolate a sympathetic counterpublic radically opposed
to the Colombian state. However, in the aftermath of this
media event, the videos derived from the FARC’s revealed
an abundance of anti-counterpublics. Media events disrupt
preprogrammed cycles of news distribution: They are mo-
ments of rupture in which a collage of confused responses
momentarily supplants existing narrative structures. What
makes media events so polyvocal is not only their much-
discussed fragmentary nature (Baudrillard 1995; White
1996) but also how they elicit personal reactions (Couldry
2003; Dayan and Katz 1992; Fiske 1996). As media scholar
John Fiske notes, “A media event . . . is a point of maxi-
mum discursive visibility . . . a point of maximum turbu-
lence . . . It also invites intervention and motivates people to
struggle to redirect some of the currents flowing through it to
serve their interests; it is therefore a site of popular engage-
ment and involvement” (1996:8, emphasis added). Video-
streaming sites such as YouTube attract users who “redirect
some of the currents flowing through” the media event and
claim a personal stake in the political by remixing or com-
menting on a video. William Mazzarella makes a similar, if
more general, point when he writes, “With the Internet’s
interactivity, one can be both spectator and participant at
the same time, because the political stage has itself become
virtual, distributed” (2010:788). Despite the resounding im-
portance of this shift, the virtual distribution of politics via
online participation in video-streaming communities has
received limited anthropological scrutiny.19 While Michael
Wesch (2008) has identified the resignification of videos as
a central feature of their online circulation, few anthropolo-
gists have parsed the politics (though see Sumiala and Tikka
2011).
As other scholars have noted, a given media event
is intimately linked to a chain of media events, past and
future (Couldry 2003; Manning 1996). It is therefore im-
portant to note how the FARC’s kidnapping of the parlia-
mentarians falls within a history of past media events in
Colombia. The M-19, a group that split from the FARC in
the early 1970s and demobilized in 1989, staged a number
of mediatic “armed propaganda” events—stealing Simo´n
Bol´ıvar’s sword, holding 14 ambassadors hostage for 61 days
in the Embassy of the Dominican Republic, printing and
distributing its own newspaper through the infrastructure
of a Cali daily—a set of antecedents for the FARC’s dramatic
act in downtown Cali (Villamizar Herrera 1995). The M-19
prided itself on media savvy, and its ex-combatants still do
(Fattal n.d.). Elver, a former middle commander of the M-
19, looked out on Stockholm’s main square in 2009 as he
proclaimed with nostalgia, “If we were around today, all of
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our videos would be on YouTube.” I bracket out this his-
tory to highlight the media event’s future, suggesting that
the future hailed by the recombinatory-circulation pattern
of the FARC’s videowas ultimately instantiated in the rescue
of I´ngrid Betancourt and other high-value hostages on July
2, 2008, a contorted reflection of the “original” media event.
What set the abduction of the parliamentarians in Cali
apart from other political kidnappings was its nerve: It hap-
pened in themiddle of the day, in a government building, in
a paramilitarized city (Taussig 2003:14–15). Alonso, a mil-
itary intelligence officer who specializes in Cali’s Valle de
Cauca and nearby Cauca provinces, grudgingly acknowl-
edged, in 2012, that the raid was well planned and exe-
cuted, and he credited the FARC’s urban militias in Cali.
When I asked why he thought the FARC recorded the kid-
napping, he responded quickly, “To use it as a recruiting
tool, to demonstrate their military legitimacy (estatus belig-
erante).” Roberto, a demobilized rebel from the FARC’s 6th
Front, which operates in the region where the kidnapping
took place, remembers watching the video in a rebel camp.
“At the time, I thought it was the best thing the movement
could do. It waswell organized and strategic,” he said. “They
told us these were the kind of operations we needed to do,
that we should take notes.”
The FARC used the video not only to trumpet its po-
litical position and military strength but also, albeit fleet-
ingly, to depict its fighters as more than the cutout repre-
sentations of file footage, challenging the rote invocation
of terrorism by government officials and Colombian corpo-
rate media. The momentary disruption of mass media for-
mulism, however, would boomerang on the FARC when an
accidental massacre validated its terrorist label.
On June 28, 2007, more than five years after the Cali
kidnapping, a laconic comunicado announced the death of
11 of the 12 hostages (Anncol 2007). Their lives ended as
abruptly as the abduction had occurred. While 6,723 peo-
ple were kidnapped between 1996 and 2006 (personal com-
munication, February 8, 2011), it was the tragedy of the
parliamentarians’ death that sparked a massive Facebook
campaign, “A Million Voices Against the FARC,” which cul-
minated in a global mobilization—stoked by the Colom-
bian government and mass media—denouncing the FARC
in more than 200 cities: a consummate moment in its polit-
ical isolation (Fattal 2012:946).20
Chained to a tree 80 meters from the main FARC
camp—punishment for leaving a red shirt out to dry
while the military was flying overhead—Sigifredo Lo´pez
(2011:178–179) heard barrages of gunfire and cries of “Don’t
let them go!” but did not see the massacre. After the inci-
dent, the 60th Front, custodian of the hostages, kept him
isolated. He only sensed the import of the exchange days
later, when one of the rebels confided to him, “Some idiots
from the 29th Front came in without warning. We fucked it
up” (Lo´pez 2011:183). Over time, despite bursts of attention
in the nationalmedia, the story of the parliamentarians dis-
appeared from headlines and blended into the generalized
tragedy of kidnapping in Colombia, leaving video stream-
ing as the battleground for framing the event and its tragic
unfolding.
The wider media environment: Plan Colombia and FARCLANDIA,
1998–2002
To understand why calls for violence against the FARC pre-
dominate in YouTube forums, a broader sketch of Colom-
bia’smedia environment is useful. In a 2008 survey of nearly
4,000 Colombians, about 90 percent responded that, in the
pastmonth, they had seen the news programs of either RCN
or Caracol, the two national television networks (owned by
two of the largest corporate conglomerates in the coun-
try and heavily slanted toward the government; Comisio´n
Nacional de la Televisio´n 2008:17). In rural areas, radio
has greater penetration. In 2011, when the Ministry of De-
fense surveyed FARC deserters who had joined the govern-
ment’s demobilization program, asking how they learned
of the program, they responded: radio, 42.5 percent; flier,
15 percent; television, 15 percent; loudspeaker (most often
affixed to the bottom of a helicopter), 8.5 percent; printed
press, 0.5 percent; and other (e.g., word of mouth), 18.5 per-
cent. The Internet did not register.When asked onwhich ra-
dio station they had heard the message, 71 percent said the
army’s station, which reaches remote municipalities and
with a clearer signal than private stations.
My interviews with former rebels corroborated the sur-
vey’s suggestion that the Internet is all but irrelevant to the
FARC’s rank and file and the organization’s primary con-
stituency, the peasantry. Many former combatants simply
described Internet access from rebel camps and rural ar-
eas as “difficult,” noting that Internet connectivity is the
exclusive privilege of commanders of well-financed fronts.
While the FARC’s urban and international sympathizers use
the Internet to delegitimize the state, they rightfully sus-
pect that military intelligence officers monitor this activ-
ity. When I visited Cafe´ Estereo, an Internet radio station
for the militant Left, in a cramped Stockholm basement,
the group of friends running the operation—mostly former
members of the Unio´n Patrio´tica, a FARC-aligned political
party decimated by assassinations in the 1980s (RomeroOs-
pina 2011)—joked about frequent denial-of-service attacks
routing transmission to Colombian military radio. Passing
plastic cups of whiskey around tables topped with audio
mixers, the leaders of a principal media outlet for Colom-
bia’s radical Left were literally underground, 6,000 miles
from Bogota´, a scene emblematic of the isolation of pro-
FARC counterpublics.
This isolation is not surprising considering the un-
even Internet access between urban and rural populations
in Colombia, the looming and legitimate concerns about
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surveillance and interference by military intelligence, and
the antiterrorist terms of YouTube’s community guidelines.
While the FARC clearly embodies what may be called a
“counterpublic,” the precise definition of this termhas been
an issue of contention between Warner and another lead-
ing public-sphere theorist, Nancy Fraser. In differentiating
his definition of counterpublic from that of Fraser’s “sub-
altern counterpublic” (1990:67), Warner argues that coun-
terpublics are more revolutionary and less reformist. He
writes, “A counterpublic maintains at some level, conscious
or not, an awareness of its subordinate status” (2002:86).
The FARC is acutely aware of its subordinate position.
Timochenko, the FARC commander who assumed power
in 2011 after three high-level commanders were killed in
military operations, opens his letter to the renowned histo-
rian of the Colombian conflict, Medo´filo Medina, by com-
plaining, “There is an established media prism, and who-
ever thinks differently or is opposed to the declarations of
the powerful is destined for the Picota,” the country’s infa-
mous prison (Jime´nez 2012).21 The publics the FARC man-
ages to affect—beyond the transnational radical Left—are
primarily lower-tech publics, which it reaches by “working
the masses” (trabajo de masas): through personal engage-
ment, civic meetings, sponsored concerts, and local radio
programs. In Colombia, the FARC’s ability to form counter-
publics is subject to geographies of rebel and state influence
and technologies of distribution. The consequence is a frag-
mented national arena inwhich publics and counterpublics
engage only obliquely with each other.
The state of direct dialogue between the rebels and the
government during the administration of Andre´s Pastrana
(1998–2002) is captured by the iconic image of the mus-
tachioed president sitting alone on a dais, in front of the
yellow, blue, and red horizontal stripes of the Colombian
flag. The empty plastic chair to the president’s right had
been reserved for the FARC’s cofounder,ManuelMarulanda
Ve´lez, whonever showed.His absence on this occasion, Jan-
uary 7, 1999, marked an inauspicious start to a “national
dialogue” and was the source of irreparable damage to the
president, a former newscaster who wagered all his politi-
cal capital on negotiations with the FARC. Pastrana waited
until 2002 to acknowledge what the photograph portended:
The peace process, like many before it (Dı´az Uribe 1995;
Medina and Sa´nchez 2003), was doomed. Washington drew
the same conclusion sixmonths afterMarulanda’s symbolic
snub. In the summer of 1999, President Clinton’s national
security advisor, Sandy Berger, called the undersecretary for
political affairs at the State Department, Thomas Pickering,
instructing him to assemble an interagency effort to ad-
dress the fact that “things are getting worse in Colombia”
(Pickering 2009).
That phone call, itself the product of intensive ad-
vocacy (Tate n.d.), sewed the seeds of the multibillion-
dollar aid packages intended to upgrade Colombian mili-
tary and law-enforcement agencies: Plan Colombia. Central
to the foreign assistance was a revamping of military intel-
ligence (Porch and Delgado 2010). The reforms would take
nearly a decade to show results in counterinsurgency terms.
While the Colombian military and the FARC were girding
themselves for all-out confrontation, the demilitarized zone
became a phantasmagoric space—“FARCLANDIA”—where
cocaine served as currency and journalists and adventurers
flocked to drink whiskey and take photographs of the last of
a type: the Latin American jungle revolutionary. Though the
origin of the name FARCLANDIA is unknown, foreign cor-
respondents played an important role in spreading it. Sen-
tences like “Farclandia is a country within a country” dot
press coverage anxious but curious about the FARC’s au-
thority (Guardian 2000).22 Outside FARCLANDIA, the war
raged unabated. The faltering dialogue between the gov-
ernment and the rebels broke down on February 20, 2002,
when the FARC kidnapped Senator Jorge Gechem Turbay.
With satellite images as props, President Pastrana went on
national television to highlight the FARC’s hypocrisies, de-
clare the peace process dead, and give the rebels 48 hours
to flee the zone. To prove the sovereignty of his government,
Pastrana traveled to FARCLANDIA’s largest urban center,
San Vicente de Cagua´n, on February 23, 2002, the same day
I´ngrid Betancourt, a senator and minor presidential candi-
date, planned to be there.
Part 3: Operation Check and its celebratory
recombinations
Betancourt’s third video proof of life
Kidnapped en routewith othermembers of her campaign—
less than two months before the parliamentarians’
capture—Betancourt never made it to San Vicente. In
her best-selling captivity memoir, she writes that, after
arriving at a FARC camp, she “noticed a game of chess on
the corner of what was meant to be a table. That such a
thing could exist in the middle of this self-contained world
was both unexpected and surprising. But once I sat in front
of the chessboard, I was overcome with panic. We were
the pawns” (2010:64). Betancourt’s status as the FARC’s
highest-profile political hostage, a presidential candidate,
and a French–Colombian dual citizen lent her case a
diplomatic dimension others lacked. She was more than
a captured pawn; she was a queen. The FARC demanded
many pawns of their own, imprisoned in Colombian jails,
for her return. Recall the title of the video of the parliamen-
tarians’ kidnapping, For an Exchange (Por el canje). This
inequality was not lost on Betancourt’s fellow hostages.
I interviewed one of them, Captain William Pe´rez, a
corporal when freed during Operation Check, in a Ministry
of Defense office in 2012. Trained as a nurse, he had tended
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to rebels and hostages alike. He spoke softly and without a
trace of bitterness when describing the indignities of being
chained to a fellow hostage (even during trips to the bath-
room in the middle of the night) and of the difference in
value between hostages: “If we were only soldiers, the mili-
tary would bring in the troops. We might live, we could get
killed, but the consequences would not be the same as if
they killed the North Americans,23 if they killed I´ngrid.”
In classic hostage-negotiation fashion, Betancourt and
her fellow captives were periodically displayed to the public
alive tomaintain their exchange value. The FARCpersuaded
Betancourt to record proof-of-life videos as opportunities
to send messages to her family on three occasions: weeks
after the kidnapping, at the one-year mark, and after more
than five years of captivity. In the second and third video
missives, Betancourt contested the FARC’s editorial ma-
nipulation. In a conversation with her campaign manager
and fellow captive, Clara Rojas, Betancourt explained why
she refused to cooperate with the second video: “I haven’t
forgotten the way they treated us last time. We recorded
twenty minutes, and they sent ten, arbitrarily choosing
whatever suited them. Rau´l Reyes [of the FARC] makes dec-
larations in my place, stealing my voice. That’s unaccept-
able. I refuse to play along with their tricks” (2010:162). Be-
tancourt remained vigilant about her image. She declined
to watch a movie on a laptop for fear of being filmed do-
ing so, and she ran from a dance floor after noticing a
rebel recording from behind a tree (Betancourt 2010:357,
375).
After more than five years of captivity, Betancourt de-
cided on silence as the best approach to her circumstances.
Her third proof-of-life video evokes, with disconcerting
beauty, a saintly iconicity. Insects hum and birds chirp as
she sits at a quarter-turn from the camera, eyes downcast
and hands clasped. She is gaunt, ill with hepatitis, but digni-
fied. The camera zooms in and out as if observing a rare zo-
ological specimen. She recalls being objectified by the cam-
era: “The red light came on for good. He had lied tome. The
letter would never reach my mother. I sat stiffly on Conso-
lacion’s bench. Lord, you know that this proof of life exists
against my will. May your will be done, I prayed in silence,
and swallowed my tears and my pride. I did not want my
children to seeme like this” (2010:492). The video circulated
widely, promoted by all of the major news outlets, and pro-
vided a compelling testament to the cruelty of kidnapping.
Eight months later, having recovered from hepatitis in
Pe´rez’s care, she would see her family in a dramatic home-
coming. “That moment, the first hug with my mom, that’s
a moment that I’ve seen many times, and also when the
plane arrived with my kids,” Betancourt said in a 2013 tele-
phone interview. She revisits the scenes of her release peri-
odically, in images packaged in news segments that include
even more dramatic footage of the rescue itself.
Operation Check and the rescue footage
In 2008 another media event transpired, Operation Check,
a military intervention that responded to the parliamen-
tarians’ kidnapping. Betancourt, three defense contractors
from the United States, and 11 other long-term hostages
were rescued in an operationmore audacious and dramatic
than the one carried out by the FARC in Cali. Pe´rez reflects
on themorning of liberation: “We were writing letters. They
said the commission would arrive at noon, and when it did
we crossed a river. We were emotional because they were
coming from civilization, but we didn’t have any idea what
was going to happen.” Whereas the FARC had masquer-
aded as the military six years earlier, here military officers
masqueraded as FARC rebels, international observers, jour-
nalists, and humanitarian aid workers. Headlines around
the world celebrated Operation Check, which seemed out
of character for a Colombian military known more for an
egregious human rights record than for delicate intelligence
operations.
With information gleaned fromdemobilized rebels and
intercepted communications, the Colombian military res-
cued the hostages by relaying fake orders to relocate them
to the pa´ramo and introduce them to the FARC’s new
commander.24 (Alfonso Cano, an anthropology student in
his youth, had recently replaced FARC cofounder Manuel
Marulanda, whose death by natural causes was confirmed
onMay 26, 2008.) A white helicopter—much like those used
in hostage releases negotiated by President Hugo Cha´vez
of Venezuela—arrived along the Apaporis River in the De-
partment of Guaviare carrying military officers posing as
FARC envoys (in Che Guevara T-shirts), international ob-
servers and aid workers (their foreign accents picked up in
acting lessons), and a journalist and cameraman. When it
took off again, it carried this cast of disguised operatives, the
hostages, and two of their captors.
Once in the air and en route to their “new location,”
Ce´sar and Gafas, the commander and second in com-
mand of the FARC’s 1st Front, were overtaken, stripped,
and handcuffed—a moment Betancourt described in my
interview with her as “the most convincing detail of the
operation.” The hostages were then told their new captors
were really their saviors: “We’re from the National Army,
and you’re free!” Those words, nearly the inverse of the
FARC’s utterance while carting away the parliamentarians
from Cali, exacted the revenge hailed by the recombination
pattern of the FARC’s video, surprisingly bloodlessly.
At a press conference two days later, Minister of De-
fense Juan Manuel Santos, who is now Colombia’s presi-
dent, released footage of the operation, including the ju-
bilant moment the hostages learned they were free. News
reports repeated Betancourt’s comment upon arrival in Bo-
gota´: “The operation was perfect.” Perfect staging, perfect
acting, a perfect heteroglossic “novel,” to use Santos’s word
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(Associated Press 2008). The video of the rescue bears strik-
ing similarities to that of the parliamentarians’ kidnapping.
Both document elaborate ruses in enemy territory; both
feature white transportation vehicles; both challenge the
formulism of journalism. The video of the rescue, however,
provided a flash of good news, one that pierced a national
callousness developed by perpetually consuming represen-
tations of war.
The footage of the rescue circulated unabated online
and off, its recombinations celebratory. Search for “I´ngrid
Betancourt rescue” on YouTube’s website and find the video
offered by the Colombian Ministry of Defense at a press
conference on July 4, 2008, recombined in exuberant news
broadcasts, documentaries feting the operation’s artifice,
and even a made-for-TV mini-series.25 The footage was
compelling, the news was excellent, and the political stakes
were high. So it flowed, from a fake reporter’s camera to the
world, through all available channels with barely a trace of
antagonistic recombination.
The segment of the rescue video shared at the July 4,
2008, press conference begins shortly after the helicopter
lands. The camera surveys the scene, rows of FARC rebels
standing at attention between coca bushes. The “journalist”
and his “cameraman” approach the commanding officer,
Ce´sar, and attempt to distract himwith an interview. Laugh-
ing uncomfortably, Ce´sar denies the request. The camera-
man then shifts his gaze to the hostages preparing to board
the helicopter. One of them, Lieutenant Malago´n, insists on
telling his story to the camera:
Malago´n: (emotionally) Excuse me, I have only one
thing to say. I’ve been chained for 10 years. I am Lieu-
tenant Malago´n of the glorious Colombian military,
kidnapped—for many factors—by this guerrilla.
Journalist: (interjecting)Words of LieutenantMalago´n.
We can’t transmit them live, we can’t transmit them,
but we know the suffering.
M: They should be transmitted, because I have some-
thing very important to say.
Malago´n’s testimony is cut off as the scene shifts to Betan-
court and the other hostages, their hands bound with white
plastic ties. The audio drops out as they enter the helicopter,
its blades swirling overhead. The camera pans back to the
FARC unit standing at attention, unaware that their most
valuable hostages are about to fly to freedom.26 The footage
cuts to the jubilant scene inside the helicopter, shaky im-
ages of tears streaming down Betancourt’s cheeks, exuber-
ant hugs, and cries of joy, ending on this emotional climax.
But even a careful release of video fragments in the
most auspicious of conditions can tack back. On the tar-
mac in Bogota´, Betancourt shared her first impressions of
the operation: “The helicopters arrived, and out came some
characters, I mean absolutely surreal. Some men dressed
with logos and certificates of being from I don’t know what.
I looked at all of this and said to myself: These people, who
are they? What international committee is this?” (2008).
Betancourt had seen the logos of the RedCross; the “In-
ternational HumanitarianMission,” a fictitious NGOwhose
website was part of the ruse; and TeleSur, the cable news
station largely underwritten by the Venezuelan govern-
ment. The appropriation of those symbols, particularly the
RedCross logo, drew some criticism (BBCMundo 2008). But
cheers for the military and jeers for the FARC drowned out
the ethical debate about the sanctity of the neutrality of the
Red Cross and the press. The future hailed by the celebra-
tory recombinations of “Operation Check” is one in which
the Geneva conventions are breached and NGOs and jour-
nalists are politicized to the point of militarization: a classic
dystopian vision, peace by total war.
Part 4: Celebratory recombinations,
documentaries, and newscasts
Onemonth after Operation Check, the ColombianMinistry
of Defense released a 33-minute behind-the-scenes docu-
mentary, Soldiers without armor (Soldados sin coraza), of
the operation. It includes more-extensive footage from the
rescue; planning sessions and motivational speeches; and
interviews with former hostages, top military brass, and in-
telligence agents, their identities concealed. The documen-
tary, initially aired by RCN, Colombia’s largest television
network,27 circulates in three parts on YouTube, each ac-
companied by gushing comments. It showcases the oper-
ation’s chicanery, from the process of selecting participants
to the way fake messages were relayed from a jungle camp
(with appropriate ambient noise) and the adornment of the
helicopter with a no-guns logo.
Soldados sin coraza goes into detail about the piv-
otal role of the “journalist.” Even more than in the case of
the FARC’s kidnapping of the parliamentarians, the cam-
era here is a tactical weapon, not only reinforcing the story
line the officers are performing but also actively manipulat-
ing the scene. In the video, the officer who played the role
of cameraman explains, “[The journalist and I] had to be
inseparable, and our objective was to completely distract
Ce´sar and Gafas.” Upon landing in the rebel camp, the jour-
nalist, cameraman, and leader of the mission went straight
to Ce´sar and introduced themselves. Quickly, the journal-
ist and mission leader started bickering about conducting
an interview with Ce´sar, while others corralled the hostages
toward the helicopter. Ce´sar “did not even have a second to
think or look at the characters in the group,” recalls the jour-
nalist. After the leader of themission said goodbye to Ce´sar,
the journalist coaxed the latter into an interview, despite his
initial refusal. Loading the hostages into the helicopter was
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taking longer than anticipated, so the journalist stalled by
trying to prolong the interview.
Journalist: Commander, do you think this is the begin-
ning of a future peace process?
Ce´sar: We could say that spaces are opening for that.
The circumstances will determine the opportunities.
J: What does the FARC want from the national govern-
ment, friendly countries, the international community
so that soon . . . [Ce´sar walks away]. Cut cut.
Requests to the operation’s “nurse” for medicine caused
further delays. Finally, as the hostages boarded the heli-
copter, the journalist and cameraman circled behind the
FARC troops, repeating, “Backlighting, backlighting,” to dis-
tract their attention from the helicopter.
In addition to the celebratory footage after the cast of
soldiers overpowered and handcuffed Ce´sar and Gafas in
the helicopter (the rescuers even sang the army’s hymn),
the documentary shows the reaction of military comman-
ders who had been awaiting the news, the praise of U.S.
ambassador William Brownfield, and Ce´sar being dragged
in his underwear across the lawn of the Tolemaida mili-
tary base. Marta, the demobilized rebel I mention above,
had been captured months before the operation and obli-
gated (“me toco´”) to collaborate with military intelligence
officers preparing Operation Check. I interviewed her in
a government reintegration center in 2012. Wearing ur-
ban camouflage—jeans, a faux leather jacket, and blue
eyeliner—she reflected on the FARC’s perspective on the
operation with clinical distance: “Ce´sar was seen as some-
one very committed to the organization . . . But what they
say is that Ce´sar wasn’t captured, that it was a plan he
had with his girlfriend. The guerrilla called him a traitor . . .
[who] was later tricked by the government.” The images of
Ce´sar blindfolded, being dragged across the lawn, visually
refute the conspiracy theory, whichmay ormay not be true.
Two made-for-TV documentaries also circulate online,
Operacio´n jaque by National Geographic (50 minutes) and
El rescate perfecto by the Discovery Channel (43 minutes).
They are of a similar ilk to, though less overtly propagan-
distic than, Soldados sin coraza. Online, the documentaries
about Operation Check are outnumbered by newscasts re-
porting on the event. The most common and most viewed
recombinations of the rescue footage are the television
broadcasts of Defense Minister Santos and General Mario
Montoya narrating the operation over the projection of the
rescue footage to journalists at the July 4, 2008, press confer-
ence. The voices that come to the fore in the celebratory re-
combinations are those of the country’s top military brass,
intelligence officers, LieutenantMalago´n, and an emotional
and appreciative I´ngrid Betancourt.28 The amplified voices
align with those emerging from the recombinatory circula-
tion of the FARC’s video of its kidnapping in Cali, drowning
out pro-FARC counterpublics in both instances.
Conclusion
I have demonstrated above how recombinatory circula-
tion of kidnapping-related videos on YouTube constrains
pro-FARC counterpublics and reproduces old media bi-
ases in Colombia, highlighting the limits of “openness” on
YouTube. The two videos at the heart of this article declare
reductive visions for Colombia’s political future: rid of the
rebel scourge or liberated from oligarchic overlords (even
if the enduring reality is of their violent coexistence, along
with affiliated armed actors). While the FARC’s video is re-
signified antagonistically, the recombinations of the mil-
itary’s video are celebratory, indexing dominant publics’
ability to stymie and overwhelm pro-FARC counterpublics
online.
Ethnographically, this article illuminates how that con-
straint works through the resignification of two video texts
by derivative videos circulating online. The recombinations
of the FARC’s kidnapping video and of the military’s rescue
video evince a preponderance of anti-FARC publics, leaving
the insurgents limited media space both online and off. Re-
flecting on this exclusion, Roberto, a former rebel from the
region of the parliamentarians’ kidnapping, says, “The gov-
ernment has RCN, Caracol, all those news programs, the ra-
dio. If the movement had one of those outlets it would get
all of its videos into the public light.”
As Roberto makes clear, the principal ground in the
propaganda war between the FARC and the Colombian
government continues to be television and radio airwaves.
While YouTube provides a forum for pro-FARC counter-
publics to circulate their videos, anti-FARC publics tru-
culently reconfigure them. This dynamic—combined with
structural exclusions, such as the relative lack of Inter-
net in rural areas and YouTube’s antiterrorist community
guidelines—constrains pro-FARC publics and entrenches a
default speaking position that favors military reprisals, cre-
ating an atomizedmob clamoring for violence from behind
their screens. When the FARC seeks to pierce, even if mo-
mentarily, the firewall reinforcing its political isolation with
another act of spectacular violence, that attempt, in turn,
mobilizes a violent response. This polarization punctuates
and propels an armed conflict that spirals on.
Even as negotiations in Havana between the FARC and
the Colombian government advance, the FARC struggles
to maintain its online media platforms. Shortly after the
peace process was publicly announced in October 2012,
the blog the FARC used to distribute its comunicados—
hosted by Blogger and owned by Google—was taken off-
line, only to be reactivated six months later (El Espectador
2013). Immediately afterward, the FARC’s Facebook page
disappeared, prompting the group to issue a statement
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urging people to contact Facebook and “demand the page
be re-established” (FARC 2013), appealing for the same par-
ticipation that marginalizes it on YouTube. Those two in-
cidents are consistent with the wider practice I have ana-
lyzed here of denying the FARC media space through any
means possible. As this article highlights, the perpetual me-
dia dominance of the right wing in Colombia, online and
off, poses a structural challenge to a negotiated solution
to the country’s war. While the two sides appear deter-
mined to sign a peace agreement, endowing it with popu-
lar legitimacy via referendum or other participatory means
could run up against intensely anti-FARC publics. Easing
the FARC’s media marginalization is a necessary if insuffi-
cient condition to ensure its transition to unarmed politics
does not founder—again (Romero Ospina 2011).29
Beyond Colombia, this article highlights the need for
greater anthropological scrutiny of the politics of participa-
tory circulation online.While the discipline has a strong tra-
dition of analyzing resignification through circulation (go-
ing back to Bronislaw Malinowski’s classic The Argonauts
of the Western Pacific [1922]), the emergent field of an-
thropology of online media rarely applies this rich history
to Internet users’ reconfiguration of media texts, which
both resignifies them and transforms the circuits of media
distribution. When an Israeli musician remixes Muammar
Ghadaffi’s “door to door” speech into a music video and
uploads it to YouTube, mocking the leader and highlight-
ing his genocidal intent or when thousands of users appro-
priate the global video meme “Gangnam Style” (Shifman
2013), participatory circulation has political effects anthro-
pologists can unpack with empirical work combining on-
line and offline worlds. This article is an initial attempt to
do that by focusing on how interactivity on YouTube adds
layers to Colombia’s propaganda war. The politics of par-
ticipatory circulation vary across political arenas, requir-
ing detailed ethnographic research in each instance. Al-
though anthropologists have paid sustained critical atten-
tion to how media texts move and mutate (e.g., Spyer and
Steedly 2013), considering how circulation itself is being re-
configured through interactivity online can enable a politi-
cal analysis befitting the digital age.
Notes
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this article at the “Engaging Images” panel of the 2008 AAA meet-
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ments in that forum. For their thoughtful feedback, I am grateful
to: Joa˜o Biehl, Steve Caton, Josh Fattal, Michael Herzfeld, Charles
Hirshkind, Julie Kleinman, Sara Lipka, Rheana Juno Parren˜as, Fed-
erico Pe´rez, Robert Samet, Claudio Soppranzetti, Orin Starn, Mary
Margaret Steedly, Winifred Tate, Kimberly Theidon, Ana Villareal,
Michael Wesch, and especially Kevin Lewis O’Neill. The anony-
mous reviewers and Angelique Haugerud at American Ethnologist
are to be given great credit for their careful readings and insightful
suggestions. Linda Forman provided meticulous copyediting. Any
faults in the text are my own.
1. Here my argument resonates with a tide of literature that
critically confronts discourses of “digital democracy” (Boler 2008;
Dean 2009, 2010; Galloway 2004; Hindman 2009;Morozov 2011). By
showing the unevenness of YouTube as a political space and ques-
tioning its openness in Colombia, I support arguments against dig-
ital democracy even as I question the analytic purchase of the ab-
stract concept. I prefer to contribute to a growing, contextually rich,
case-based literature (Kendzior 2011; Stein 2012; Yang 2009).
2. This imbalance is further accentuated by the government’s
technological advantage and support from the United States (see
Priest 2013). While the FARC has converted guerrilla warfare into a
science of survival, the government’s massive military buildup in
the early 2000s has reduced the rebels’ offensive capacity to hit-
and-run guerrilla tactics.
3. Jodi Dean is unsparing in her assessment of the voluminous
commentary on social media. In analyzing the activism that pre-
ceded the Iraq war in 2003 and its inability to derail the U.S. inva-
sion, she dismisses the “terabytes of commentary and information”
as “the cultural effluvia” of “communicative capitalism” (2009:20):
token engagement that performs and reinforces chimerical notions
of democracy. In her view, the “cultural effluvia” ismere noise, of no
consequence to decision makers. However, my ethnography of the
Colombian Ministry of Defense, similar to Rebecca Stein’s (2012)
of the Israeli Defense Force, reveals that militaries are quite inter-
ested in managing and controlling this effluvia. In other words,
the stream of information and opinions on social media is any-
thing but inconsequential and, in fact, can determine who drowns
out whom. My focus on the effectiveness of social media is not
intended to downplay censorship, which remains an important if
opaque aspect of this story. See endnote 16.
4. LevManovich provocatively critiques interactivity as a form of
false consciousness. His piece “On Totalitarian Interactivity” (n.d.)
ironically provides a totalizing view of interactivity that collapses
this vast category into the adherence to preprogrammed options,
eclipsing possibilities for agency in the process.
5. “Recombination” echoes Jay David Bolter and Richard
Grusin’s concept of “remediation” (1999) that recent ethnogra-
phies ofmedia circulation havemobilized (Novak 2010; Silvio 2007;
Strassler 2009). Here I engage obliquely with Grusin’s subsequent
interest in “premediation,” which “focuses chiefly on future me-
dia events” (2004:37), by demonstrating how recombinations of the
FARC’s video hailed Betancourt’s rescue.
6. Peace negotiations between the Colombian government and
the FARC have focused specifically on five topics. The second, “po-
litical participation,” involved a discussion of the FARC’s access to
media in the event that the parties reach a comprehensive accord.
At the time of writing (December 2013), a provisional agreement
had been reached on this point. The joint communique´ released
by the negotiators includes a passing reference to increasingmedia
access for social movements and community programming.
7. The names of interlocutors who are not public figures are
pseudonyms, and, in a few instances, I have changed changed lo-
cations to protect the interviewees.
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8. In Colombian Spanish, the word propaganda connotes adver-
tising as well as the instrumentalization of media by armed actors.
I analyze this double meaning elsewhere (Fattal 2014), but here I
take the term to mean media messages intentionally crafted and
disseminated by armed actors on any side of the conflict to support
their military and political goals.
9. At its seventh conference in 1982, the FARC added “Army of
the People” (Eje´rcito del Pueblo) to its name, therefore the –EP in
the credit.
10. Government prosecutors arrested Lo´pez in 2012, charging
him with plotting his own kidnapping and that of his colleagues,
holding him partially responsible for their deaths. Specifically, they
accused him of providing intelligence to the FARC. He was released
three months later in a false-witness scandal.
11. All translations are by the author.
12. Two of the five staffers loaded onto the bus but freed the
same day were women, therefore the “Ladies and gentlemen.”
13. I was unable to interview the FARC videographers, editors,
and commanders involved in the kidnapping operation and its
video recording. According to former rebels and intelligence offi-
cials, many were killed in military operations in the mid-2000s in
the Naya, a highland region of the western Andes.
14. Roman gladiators’ supposed declaration to the emperor be-
fore battle.
15. According to military officers I have interviewed, Zarcoman
is a member of the air force.
16. Correspondence with a senior official at Google did not il-
luminate the mechanics of removing a video. Rather, he directed
me to the “Dangerous Acts” clause of YouTube’s community guide-
lines in which “inciting violence,” including “videos that train ter-
rorists,” is the underlying criterion. However, my research on amil-
itary intelligence unit reveals that officers travel to Internet cafes
and pose as “citizen journalists,” using CNN’s iReport to circulate
its videos. I suspect the military floods YouTube with requests to
block a user or flag FARC content, triggering the system’s internal
(nonhuman) censors. Cybercensorship is a critical area of future
research.
17. The translations are intended to mirror the broken syntax of
the Spanish.
18. In 2011, bowing to public pressure, the FARC declared it
would no longer kidnap for economic purposes.
19. E. Gabriella Coleman’s 2010 review article “Ethnographic Ap-
proaches to Digital Media” is the most comprehensive survey of
the emergent field. While a review of the literature is beyond the
scope of this article, I would note that methodological questions
have dominated the nascent field, leaving areas such as interactive
circulation understudied. How to bound the object of study, specif-
ically in terms of conjugating online and offline worlds, has created
a profuse literature. In the future I suspect that literature will be
read through a lens of disciplinary anxiety (“What does this mean
for fieldwork?”), rather than as an engagement with the evolving
online world on its own terms.
20. The mobilization, the apogee of the “No More FARC” move-
ment (linking the Colombian government, mass media, and many
civil-society groups), grew even as paramilitary massacres became
more frequent and macabre. That disjuncture is partly attributable
to paramilitaries’ multifaceted public-relations campaigns involv-
ing interactive websites, some of which included video games in
which players hunted down and killed “farcistas” and “elenos” (i.e.,
members of the FARC and of theNational Liberation Army [Eje´rcito
de Liberacio´n Nacional, or ELN]). The paramilitaries’ websites ren-
dered the FARC’s rudimentary in comparison (Sandoval Forero
2006; Tate 2007).
21. The majority of the FARC’s comunicados include an element
of media criticism. When the FARC captured Rome´o Langlois, a
French reporter (and my roommate at the time), it conditioned his
release on a “national and international debate about freedom of
the press.”
22. The term FARCLANDIA warrants its own article; the follow-
ing reflections are preliminary thoughts for a future piece. I inter-
pret the term’s usage in Colombia as a form of dark humor. FAR-
CLANDIA operates in a register of what Australian sociologist Jeff
Browitt (2007) has called Colombian “tragic realism,” a surreal form
of tragedy, which novelist Gabriel Garcı´a Ma´rquez so eloquently
captures in his prose. FARCLANDIA, with its bilingual suffix, also
indexes a complex imaginary of the U.S.–Colombian relationship. I
might suggest that the unmarked “land” the term denotes stands in
contrast to Disneylandia, a term that has long existed in the Colom-
bian vernacular. Given Colombia’s class-based engagement with
the United States (the wealthy go there on vacation, to shop, and
to see family, while the poor go there to escape economic hard-
ship), was FARCLANDIA not Disneylandia’s other? FARCLANDIA
was where the FARC held wealthy hostages (and also less wealthy
prisoners of war) while extorting their families. It also became a
space where poor peasants experienced upward mobility through
the cocaine economy. Finally, another “land” that would be an in-
teresting counterpoint to FARCLANDIA is Fordlandia, the experi-
mental U.S. suburb in Amazonian Brazil that Henry Ford created to
expand his company’s supply of natural rubber (see Grandin 2009).
23. The North Americans he refers to were contractors for
Northrup Grumman working for U.S. Southern Command who
were captured when their surveillance plane crashed in FARC
territory in 2003.
24. The pa´ramo is an ecosystem in the northern Andes above the
forest line but below the snow line.
25. Occasionally, a recombined video will raise questions in a
conspiratorial register about U.S. or Israeli involvement in Oper-
ation Check, or a French-brokered ransom deal.
26. This image of the FARC not yet aware they have been duped
parallels the image of the parliamentarians staring blankly from
inside the bus. Both images wink to the audience, mocking the
enemy.
27. RCN’s largest shareholder is the Colombian billionaire Carlos
Ardila Lu¨lle. His holding company, Organizacio´n Ardila Lu¨lle, also
owns Colombia’s largest soft-drink company andMedell´ın’s soccer
club. RCN’s editorial position is vehemently anti-FARC and closely
aligned with the government.
28. The cozy relationship Betancourt affected with the mili-
tary upon her release changed radically in the summer of 2010
when she filed a lawsuit against the Colombian government for
not providing sufficient security the day of her capture. She fell
out of public favor after the botched lawsuit and is now subjected
to widespread ridicule within Colombia, even as she is honored
abroad.
29. In the mid-1980s the FARC launched a political movement,
the Unio´n Patrio´tica (UP), as part of an attempt to participate in
electoral politics. Paramilitaries closely aligned with the govern-
ment systematically assassinated 1,598 of its members, including
its leaders. Romero Ospina’s book Unio´n patrio´tica: Expedientes
contra el olvido (2011) provides themost thorough treatment of the
tragedy to date.
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